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“What reason have we to suppose that the hoped for revolution in our understanding of 
matter at the most fundamental level will involve ascribing essentially mentalistic proper- 
ties to it?” 
(Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2015: 31) 
 
“Even the faint and blurry is phenomenology too much for the humble electron.” 
(McGinn 2006: 95) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When I was doing my PhD in the early 1990s, I was amused by Jerry Fodor writing about “epiphobia” – 
which he defined as the fear that one is turning into an epiphenomenalist (Fodor 1989: 59). The 
philosophers suffering from epiphobia were physicalists who did not want to deny the existence of 
intentional (understood as non-physical) states. The worry of epiphenomenalism was there because 
if one accepted the causal closure of the physical domain, there seemed to be no way that the inten- 
tional states qua intentional could be causally responsible for behavioural outcomes – which amounts 
to epiphenomenalism. But epiphobia is not the only worry a philosopher of mind can suffer from. 
In his essay “Panpsychism” Thomas Nagel (1979) proposed that a set of reasonable assumptions, 
commonly held by philosophers, imply panpsychism – the view that the basic elements of matter 
(“physical ultimates”) have mental properties. Nagel saw this option (which he took as a sign that 
something may not be quite right) as arising out of the assumptions that we ought to take conscious 
experience seriously, while denying psychophysical reductionism and radical emergence (for discus- 
sion, see Pylkkänen 1996). More recently Galen Strawson (2006) has with great force argued toward 
a similar conclusion, suggesting that the basic elements of matter even involve experience (Strawson 
2006: 25). For him the idea arises as a result of assuming that everything concrete is physical; that 
everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete 
reality (2006: 25). Note especially that he considers “micropsychism” as the only reasonable option, 
not merely as something one arrives at via inference to the best explanation. 
Those who find these arguments compelling may find themselves overcome by a worry, panpho- 
bia, which we can define, following Fodor, as the fear that one is turning into a panpsychist. Why 
should one be afraid of turning into a panpsychist? Strawson himself admits having felt abashed 
about arguing for panpsychism (2006: 186) and acknowledges that it is not easy to accept in the 
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current intellectual climate (2006: 25). Nagel has remarked that “panpsychism has the faintly sick- 
ening odor of something put together in a metaphysical laboratory” (1986: 49), while Seager and 
Allen-Hermanson note that panpsychism has come to seem an implausible view, given our immense 
scientific knowledge of the physical world and the corresponding desire to explain everything in 
physical terms (2015: 1). Peter Simons summarizes more bluntly how many feel about this issue: 
 
“Panpsychism, at least in caricature, is one of the most immediately counterintuitive and 
off-putting of metaphysical positions. The idea of electrons making decisions about how to 
spin, nuclei harbouring intentions to split, or photons with existential Angst, makes ideal- 
ism seem positively sane.” 
(Simons 2006: 146-7) 
 
Colin McGinn provides a more sympathetic and yet critical characterization: 
 
“Panpsychism is surely one of the loveliest and most tempting views of reality ever devised; 
and it is not without its respectable motivations either. There are good arguments for it, and 
it would be wonderful if it were true – theoretically, aesthetically, humanly. Any reflective 
person must feel the pull of panpsychism once in a while. It’s almost as good as pantheism! 
The trouble is that it’s a complete myth, a comforting piece of utter balderdash.” 
(McGinn 2006: 93) 
 
If panpsychism is taken to mean that the elementary particles of physics (physical “ultimates”) have 
proto-mental properties (Nagel 1986: 49), or even involve experience (Strawson 2006: 25), the doc- 
trine seems very implausible. Nagel himself notes this: 
 
“What kind of properties could atoms have (even when they are part of a rock) that could 
qualify as proto-mental; and how could any properties of the chemical constituents of a 
brain combine to form a mental life?” 
(Nagel 1986, p. 49) 
 
Lycan underlines the lack of scientific evidence for panpsychism: 
 
“. . . there is nothing I can exhibit to show decisively that a muon or a quark is not a locus 
of experience. But neither is there any scientific evidence for panpsychism; there is no sci- 
entific reason, as opposed to philosophical argument, for believing it.” 
(Lycan 2006: 66) 
 
He goes on to spell out the absurdity of the notion: 
 
“. . . if every ultimate particle has mental properties, what sorts of mental properties in par- 
ticular do the particles have? It seems ludicrous to think that a photon has either sensory 
experiences or intentional states. (It does not even have mass.) How could it see, hear or 
smell anything? And if it has experiential properties, then presumably it also has rudimen- 
tary propositional attitudes. What would be the contents of its beliefs or desires? Perhaps it 
wishes it were a u quark.” 
(Lycan 2006: 70) 
 
More technically, McGinn worries about the causal inefficacy of the micro-experiental that seems to 
be implicit in panpsychism (cf. epiphobia!): 
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“Do the E [experiental] properties of elementary particles (or molecules or cells) contrib- 
ute to their causal powers? If so, how come physics (and chemistry and biology) never have 
to take account of their contribution? . . . if they are agreed not to have any causal powers – 
and so are entirely epiphenomenal – how can they blossom into properties that do have 
such powers once they take up residence inside brains?” 
(McGinn 2006: 94) 
 
One apparent advantage of panpsychism is that it seems to solve the problem of how the experiental- 
ity of an organism can emerge from its parts. McGinn however sees problems even here: 
“What kinds of E [experiental] properties do particles have? . . . This is a game without 
rules and without consequences. Is it really to be supposed that a particle can enjoy these 
kinds of experiences – say, feeling depressed at its monotonous life of orbiting a nucleus but 
occasionally cheered up by its experience of musical notes? [. . .] Even the faint and blurry 
is phenomenology too much for the humble electron. The problem is that we can solve the 
emergence problem only if we credit the ultimates with a rich enough phenomenology to 
form an adequate basis for a full-bodied human mind . . .” 
(McGinn 2006: 95) 
 
So, on the one hand we have excellent philosophers arguing that panpsychism is the only reasonable 
option, while equally excellent philosophers argue that the doctrine is just very implausible. Note in 
particular how the arguments against panpsychism appeal to our intuitions about elementary parti- 
cles. It is assumed to be obvious that electrons cannot make decisions, nuclei cannot harbour inten- 
tions, photons cannot have sensory experiences, intentional states or existential Angst, and atoms 
cannot have proto-mental properties. Thus, anyone who feels the pull of panpsychism but also shares 
these common anti-panpsychist intuitions is likely to experience bouts of panphobia. 
The story we will tell in this chapter does not go all the way to claim that elementary particles 
have all the properties that are ridiculed in the above quotes. However, we will propose that our best 
physics implies that elementary particles are far more complex than what is commonly supposed by 
contemporary materialist or physicalist philosophers of mind. Not only that, we will also show how 
some leading physicists have suggested that it is even reasonable to interpret some novel properties 
of elementary particles as protomental and that these protomental properties are causally efficacious. 
This, then, opens up the possibility for a scientific argument for panpsychism – or at least panpro- 
topsychism, the weaker doctrine according to which the ultimates have proto-mental properties, 
rather than mental properties in a full sense. 
Epiphobia and panphobia lie at the opposite ends of a spectrum in philosophy of mind. An epi- 
phobic worries that one’s mind-matter theory gives too weak a role for mind, while a panphobic 
worries that it gives too strong a role. In this chapter we will explore whether a cure for both epipho- 
bia and panphobia might be found in quantum theory. 
 
2. The Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory 
Quantum phenomena exhibit a curious combination of wave  and particle behavior. For example,    
in the famous two-slit experiment, electrons arrive one by one at the detecting screen at localized 
points, suggesting that they are particles. Yet as we keep on watching, the individual spots gradually 
build up an interference pattern typical of wave behavior, suggesting that each individual electron 
ALSO has wave  properties. The usual interpretation of quantum theory describes the electron with  
a wave function. In the minimalist (Bohr’s) version, the wave function only allows us to calculate 
probabilities for finding the electron (as a localized particle) at a given location. In other words,   
the wave function is seen as a part of a mathematical algorithm and is not given an ontological 
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interpretation. However, following von Neumann, many physicists assumed that the wave function 
provides a complete description of an individual quantum object. This gives rise to the many infa- 
mous puzzles of quantum theory, such as the claim that a single electron is in two (or more) places  
at once; that a cat is alive and dead at the same time; that the world at the macroscopic level is con- 
stantly branching into copies (“many worlds”); and that to solve such problems we must assume an 
ad hoc collapse of the wave function, or assume that the non-physical consciousness of the observer 
plays an active role (for some of the problems with von Neumann’s approach, see Bohm and Hiley 
1993, ch 2). Thus, it seems that quantum theory forces us to choose between Bohrian instrumen- 
talism/antirealism or some very counterintuitive realist interpretation. (For a brief introduction to 
quantum theory, see Polkinghorne 2002; Pylkkänen 2018; see also Lewis 2016; for Bohr’s views see 
Plotnitsky 2010) 
An apparently more sober realist version of quantum theory was discovered by Louis de Bro-  
glie in 1927 and independently rediscovered and further developed by  David Bohm in 1952 and    
in subsequent research. In this theory the electron is seen as a particle AND a wave. In the two-slit 
experiment the particle goes through one of the slits. The wave goes through both slits, interferes 
and guides the particle in such a way that an interference pattern is gradually formed, spot by spot,  
as many electrons pass through the slit system (thus the theory has also been called the pilot wave 
theory). It thus seems that we can have a realist or ontological interpretation of the quantum theory, 
without the usual puzzles, such as Schrödinger’s cat, many worlds, collapse of the wave function, or 
the consciousness of the observer producing physical reality (see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009; 
Bohm 1952a and 1952b; Bohm and Hiley 1987, 1993; Bricmont 2016; for latest developments, see 
Walleczek et al. (eds.) 2018; Pylkkänen et al. 2016)). 
However, the Bohm theory, too, has exotic features. For one thing it implies a non-local interac- 
tion between particles at a quantum level, creating a tension with relativity. Note however that this 
non-locality is characteristic of quantum theory in general and consistent with the experimental 
results (see Walleczek and Grössing 2016). Also, the wave function for a many-body system lives in 
a multidimensional configuration space, making it difficult to assume that it describes an ordinary 
physical field in a 3-dimensional space (see Ney and Albert (eds.) 2013). To alleviate this problem 
(and for other reasons) Bohm and Hiley (1987, 1993) proposed the radically new notion that the 
wave function describes not an ordinary physical field, but rather a field of information, which liter- 
ally in-forms the energy of the particle. Bohm (1990) further proposed that such “active informa- 
tion” can be seen as a primitive mind-like quality of elementary particles. Here, then, opens up the 
possibility for scientific (rather than merely philosophical) support for panprotopsychism. Let us thus 
examine the Bohm theory in more detail. 
While it is common in the usual interpretation of quantum theory to say that a quantum object 
(such as an electron) is a particle OR a wave (depending on the context), the Bohm theory, as we 
already mentioned, says less ambiguously that an electron is always a particle AND a wave. More pre- 
cisely, it assumes that every particle has a well-defined position and momentum and is accompanied 
by a new type of field, described by the wave function ψ which satisfies the Schrödinger equation. 
The field affects the particle via a new potential, the quantum potential Q (eq. 1): 
This suggests a model of, say, an electron as a particle which moves 
along a trajectory and which   is influenced not just by classical potentials but also by the new 
quantum potential. The quantum potential accounts for all (non-relativistic) quantum behavior, and 
in situations where the quan-   tum potential is negligible, classical physics provides a good 
approximation. From the perspective 
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of the Bohm theory we can call the physical  world “an  overall  quantum  world”. Within  this 
world there is a classical sub-world – that is, a domain where the quantum potential has a negli- 
gible effect (e.g. due to temperature), and Newton’s laws provide a good approximate description 
for how a macroscopic object (e.g. a chair) behaves. But in circumstances where the quantum 
potential is not negligible (e.g. in quantum experiments), the behavior of particles can be radically 
non-classical, 
Figures 1 and 2 provide well-known visualizations for the two-slit experiment (from Philippidis 
et al. 1979). In Figure 1 we are looking toward a partition with two slits in it. The electrons are 
moving toward us (one by one) and as they go through one of slits they encounter a quantum 
potential. One can think of a potential as a bit analogous to a mountain, so that the quan- tum 
potential will, for example, keep the electrons away from areas where it has a high value. 
The electrons have their source in a hot filament, which means that there is a random statistical 
variation in their initial positions. This means that each particle typically enters the slit system in a 
different place. Figure 2 shows possible trajectories than an electron can take after it goes through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Quantum potential for two Gaussian slits 
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Slit A Slit B 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Trajectories for two Gaussian slits 
 
 
the slits. Which trajectory it takes depends, of course, on which place it happens to enter the slit 
system. 
Note that the trajectories should be seen as a hypothesis about what may be going on in the two- 
slit experiment. Because of the uncertainty principle it is not possible to measure the initial condi- 
tions (position and momentum) of a particle simultaneously with an accuracy that would enable 
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us to predict which trajectory a given individual electron will follow (however, measurements of so-
called weak values allow us to calculate average trajectories, see Flack et al. 2018). 
 
3. The Interpretation of the Quantum Field as Active Information 
In the 1970s Bohm and Hiley (1975) began to re-examine the de Broglie–Bohm theory, partly as a 
result of the interest their research students were showing in this approach, as well as the new atten- 
tion to the question of non-locality due to John Bell’s work (see Bell 1987). They considered the 
mathematical expression of the quantum potential, which describes the way the quantum wave field 
affects the particle (eq. 1) 
 
 
 
Here h-bar is Planck’s constant divided by 2π, m is the mass of the particle, R is the amplitude of the 
quantum wave and Ñ2 is a differential operator which takes the second spatial derivative of R. The 
term Ñ2  R reflects how  R changes, i.e., the shape or form of the quantum wave. In classical phys-   
ics (e.g. with the classical electromagnetic field), a potential depends on the amplitude of the field 
(somewhat like the size of a water wave determines the effect the wave has on a floating object). 
However, Bohm realized that the quantum potential, and thus the effect of the quantum field upon 
the particle, depends only on the form or shape of the field, not on its size or amplitude R. This is so 
because R appears both in the nominator and the denumerator in the right hand side of equation 1, 
and so can be multiplied by an arbitrary constant without changing the quantum potential; a wave of 
small amplitude thus has the same effect as a wave of large amplitude, as long as the waves have the 
same form. Bohm was thereby led to suggest that the quantum field is not pushing and pulling the 
particle mechanically, but rather the quantum field literally puts form into or “in-forms” the particle 
to behave in a certain way. The idea is that the electron is moving under its own energy that is being 
in-formed by the quantum field. 
Bohm proposed that this is an instance of a general feature of active information that we see operat- 
ing at many levels of nature (for discussion, see Seager 2018). The basic idea of active information is 
that a low-energy form enters a greater energy and as a result the form of the greater energy becomes 
the same as that of the smaller energy. If you consider a ship on autopilot guided by radar waves, 
the waves are not pushing and pulling the ship. Rather, the form of the waves is taken up by the 
autopilot device and is used to direct the ship. Analogously the quantum field contains information 
about the environment of the particle (e.g. slits) and this information, along with the classical forces, 
then determines the movement of the particle. Note, however, that there are important differences 
between the ship analogy and the electron. It is important to emphasize that with the electron we 
encounter holistic active information (with non-locality and irreducible wholeness), as opposed to 
the more (classical) mechanical active information we encounter in the ship analogy (Pylkkänen 
1992: 95–6; Dickson 1996: 234). 
Bohm also realized that the idea that the essential nature of the quantum field is that it is informa- 
tion, rather than an ordinary physical field, enables one to make sense of the notorious multidimen- 
sionality of the many-body quantum field. With information, multidimensionality is a natural concept 
in the sense that information can be organized into as many dimensions as may be needed. As we will 
see later, the many-body quantum field can be seen as a common pool of information for the two particles. 
One important potential criticism of the active  information approach has to do with the notion  
of information that is presupposed. Is it really justified to use the term “information” to describe   
the sorts of processes connected to the quantum field? One can examine this question in the light    
of recent developments in the philosophy of information (e.g. Floridi 2015). Floridi distinguishes 
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between semantic and environmental information. Semantic information involves factual semantic 
contents (i.e. information as meaningful data that represents facts correctly or incorrectly). Environ- 
mental information sees information as mere correlation, e.g. the way tree rings carry information 
about age. Semantic information can be further distinguished into factual and instructional informa- 
tion. The quantum active information is about something (the environment, slits, etc.), it is for the par- 
ticle and it helps to bring about something (a certain movement of the particle). This suggests that it is 
not merely correlational but is also (proto)semantic and has both factual and instructional aspects (see 
Pylkkänen 1992: 96–8). Also, Maleeh and Amani (2012) have usefully considered active information 
in relation to Roederer’s (2005) notion of pragmatic information, suggesting that only biological sys- 
tems are capable of “genuine” information processing. I think one can argue that Bohmian quantum 
information potential involves genuine information processing (indeed, the most fundamental kind 
of genuine information processing science has thus far discovered). 
While the notion of active information in quantum theory has not been widely accepted (for 
criticism see Riggs 2008), some leading thinkers do take it seriously (e.g. Smith 2003). Also, an inter- 
esting adaptation of the active information scheme to neuroscience has been proposed by Thomas 
Filk (2012). In the field of the social sciences, Andrei Khrennikov (2004) has made imaginative use 
of the proposal and the Bohm theory – as an analogical model – has also been applied to financial 
processes by Olga Choustova (2007) and Emmanuel Haven (2005). For other ways of using the 
mathematical and conceptual tools of quantum theory to model cognition, see Wang et al. (2013). 
Of course, the notion of “quantum information” has been extensively discussed in recent years   
(e.g. Bouwmeester et al. 2000). The advantages of the concept of active information over quantum 
information are explored in Maroney (2002) and Maroney and Hiley (1999). Note finally that the 
Bohm theory can be presented in a more minimalist way without giving the quantum potential (and 
active information) a key role (see Goldstein 2013). Bohm, however, felt that at least something like 
the notion of active information is needed if we want to give an intelligible ontological interpreta- 
tion of quantum theory (Bohm and Hiley 1993: 60; see also Holland 1995: 90-1). 
 
4. Is information a Mind-Like Quality? 
So let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is a reasonable hypothesis that the quantum 
field encodes information. What reasons do we have to think that such information is a “primitive 
mind-like quality”, as Bohm suggested? The idea that cognition is information processing has, of 
course, been a central notion in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (Velmans 2009: 64–79). 
Note also that some other researchers in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies have made 
use of the concept of information in their theories of mind and consciousness. For example, Dretske 
(1981) and Barwise and Seligman (1997) have explored the possibility that information in the sense 
of factual semantic contents can be grounded in environmental information. For Dretske this was   
an important part of his attempts to give a naturalistic account of sensory experiences, qualia and 
consciousness. During recent years the notion of information has been used to explain consciousness 
most notably by David Chalmers (1996), as well as by Giulio Tononi and his co-workers (Tononi 
and Koch 2014; Oizumi et al. 2014); see also Velmans (1991a, 1991b). The relation of Bohm’s active 
information to Chalmers’s views has been discussed in Pylkkänen (2007: 244–6), while its relation to 
Tononi’s views is discussed in Pylkkänen (2016). While Bohm’s notion of information differs from 
the notions of information mentioned above, there are some relevant similarities. For example, both 
Bohm’s and Tononi’s notions of information differ from Shannon information in that they refer to 
the literal meaning of information as “in-forming”, albeit in different ways. 
The preceding indicates that the idea that information is a mind-like quality is one of the key 
options in contemporary discussions about the nature of mental states. In the light of this, Bohm’s 
proposal that quantum theoretical active information is a primitive mind-like quality of elementary 
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particles seems not too unreasonable. The proposal implies that electrons have “proto-cognition” 
(because of the information aspect) and “proto-will” (because the information is fundamentally active) 
(cf. Wendt 2015: 139). Whether it also implies that electrons have proto-phenomenal properties is a 
more tricky question. But one could claim that the electron is in some sense “perceiving” or monitor- 
ing its environment via its information field, and that such “perceiving” involves proto-phenomenality. 
 
5. Active Information and the Relation of Mind and Matter 
Bohm also thought that the idea of active information at the quantum level opened up a way to  
tackle a perennial problem in philosophy, namely that of the relationship between mind and matter 
(1989, 1990). First of all, he suggested that mental states involve a hierarchy of levels of active infor- 
mation. We do not merely think about objects in the external world, but we can also become aware 
of our thinking. He suggested that such meta-level awareness typically gives rise to a higher level of 
information. This higher level gathers information about the lower level. But because its essential 
nature is active information, it does not merely make a passive representation of the lower level. 
Rather, the higher level also acts to organize the lower level, a bit analogously to the way the active 
information in the pilot wave acts to organize the movement of the particle. And of course, we can 
become aware of this higher level of information from a yet higher level, and so on. 
How then does mind, understood as a hierarchy of levels of active information, connect with 
matter in the Bohmian scheme? First of all, he suggested that it is natural to extend the quantum 
ontology. So just as there is a pilot wave that guides the particle, there can be a super-pilot wave that 
can organize the first-order pilot wave, and so on. He claimed that such an extension is “natural” 
from the mathematical point of view (Bohm and Hiley (1993: 378–81, 385) discuss such extensions 
in the context of quantum field theory). Now it seems that we have two hierarchies, one for mind  
and another for matter. Bohm’s next step was to postulate that these are the same hierarchy, so that 
there is only one hierarchy. This then allows, at least in principle, for a new way of understanding 
how mind and body can affect each other. The meaning of information at a given level in the mind 
can act downwards, all the way to the active information in the pilot waves of particles in, say, the 
synapses or neural microtubules, and this influence can then be amplified to signals in motor cortex, 
leading to a physical movement of the body (see Hiley and Pylkkänen 2005). In a reverse process, 
perception can carry information about the external world and the inner state of the body to higher 
levels, where the meaning of the information is apprehended, and can unfold again to organize the 
more manifest levels. (For criticisms see Kieseppä (1997a, 1997b), Chrisley (1997); for replies, see 
Hiley and Pylkkänen (1997, 2001) and Pylkkänen (1992: 96)). Bohm’s discussion fits well with the 
idea of the mind-brain as a self-organizing system. Jenann Ismael (2016) has emphasized that the 
human mind also essentially includes a self-governing system which is capable of deliberative reason- 
ing and self-conscious thought. In the Bohmian scheme one can say that even conscious reflection  
in thought happens according to the total meaning that prevails in a situation (see Bohm 1990: 282). 
This weakens the distinction between self-organizing and self-governing systems. 
 
6. Quantum Ballet: The Priority of the Whole 
As has already been hinted previously, the ontological interpretation also brings into focus the “undi- 
vided wholeness” characteristic of the quantum world, implying a monistic metaphysics (cf. Schaffer 
2010). This wholeness can be seen already when considering a single particle, for because the quan- 
tum potential only depends upon the form of the field, it does not necessarily fall off with distance 
even if the intensity of the field becomes weak as the field spreads out. Thus even distant features 
(e.g. slits) of the environment of the particle can have a strong effect upon the particle, implying that 
there can be a strong context-dependence in the behaviour of the particle. In the two-body system 
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there is wholeness also in the sense that the quantum potential depends on the position of both parti- 
cles in a way that does not necessarily fall off with the distance, implying the possibility of a non-local 
interaction between the two particles. And we can generalize this to the N-body system where the 
behaviour of each particle may depend non-locally on all the others, regardless of how far away they 
may be (Bohm and Hiley 1987: 330). 
Nonlocality is an important new feature of the quantum theory, but Bohm emphasized that there 
is yet another feature that is even more radical, namely that the quantum potential Q depends on the 
quantum state of the whole system in a way that cannot be defined simply as a pre-assigned interac- 
tion between all the particles. This underlines the priority of the whole that is typical of quantum 
systems (cf. Schaffer 2010). For example, in the Hydrogen atom the interaction of the electron and 
the proton depends on the quantum state of the whole system in a way  that cannot be expressed     
in terms of the relationships of the particles alone. In this sense the whole is prior to its parts in the 
quantum domain (see Bohm and Hiley 1987: 331-2; see also Holland 1995: 281-2). 
In Bohmian terms the quantum state can be seen as a common pool of information that is guiding the 
particles in the system. Note also that the quantum state is evolving in time according to Schröding- 
er’s equation, so it is a dynamic whole that is guiding the particles. Bohm thus thought that quantum 
theory was primarily about dynamical wholeness that is not reducible to the interactions between 
individuals. As Max Jammer has pointed out, this means that the individuals are not “constitutive” to 
the whole but rather depend on the state of the whole (1988: 696). 
However, the physical world we find in everyday experience can be approximately described in 
terms of classical physics, characterized by relatively independent and separable objects. How do we 
get from quantum wholeness to classical separability? The answer is that in certain circumstances the 
wave function (i.e. the quantum field) of a system factorizes into two parts, and the corresponding 
subsystems will then behave independently. These factorized parts of the wave functions represent 
independent pools of information. The subsystems will cease to be guided by a common pool of 
information and will instead respond to independent pools. 
An example that illustrates the preceding is provided by superconductivity where electrons at low 
temperatures are able to move without resistance in a wire. In terms of the Bohm theory this happens 
because the electrons are guided by a common wave function (or common pool of information) to 
move in such a way that they do not scatter from obstacles but rather go around them in a coordi- 
nated way. This is like a “ballet dance” where the wave function is the score and the particles are the 
dancers. At higher temperatures the property of superconductivity disappears. This is because the 
wave function factorizes into independent pools of information, and the particles behave indepen- 
dently and scatter from obstacles. The particles are no longer like ballet dancers but are now like an 
unorganized crowd of people who are acting independently and get in each other’s way (1993: 71). 
The key point is that the quantum potential arising under certain conditions can  organize  the 
activity of an entire set of particles in a way that depends directly on the state of the whole. Bohm 
and Hiley think it is plausible that such an organization can be carried to higher and higher levels 
and eventually may become relevant to living beings. Indeed, given the recent advances in quantum 
biology (Ball 2011, Marais et al. 2018)), it is tempting to speculate that the quantum potential (or 
some higher-order quantum-like “biological potential”) plays a relevant role in determining whether 
a system is “living” or “non-living”. The idea is that when the quantum potential within a biologi- 
cal system has a non-negligible effect, it provides the organic unity characteristic of a living system. 
Death, on the other hand, would correspond to a situation when the wave  function factorizes and  
the system loses its organic unity (cf. Pylkkänen 1992: 55). 
Mental states, too, can be seen as involving common pools of information which guide and co- 
ordinate spatially distinct neural activities. Taken as a literal quantum model of the brain, a Bohmian 
common pool of quantum information in the brain would imply that there can be non-local cor- 
relations between particles in spatially separate brain areas. This, of course, is a speculative idea, but 
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recent advances in quantum brain theory (see Hameroff and Penrose 2014) make such a radical idea 
at least conceivable. 
Note also that the idea of a common pool of information is interestingly similar to Baars’s (2007) 
idea of a global workspace in consciousness studies. If we assume that consciousness would cor- 
respond to a situation where a common pool of mental information is having a global effect on 
distinct neural modules, then we could say that the transition from conscious to non-conscious state 
corresponds to some kind of factorization of such a conscious common pool of information to non- 
conscious independent pools. However, as Rosenthal (2009) has pointed out, while consciousness is 
sometimes connected with the global effects of a workspace, there also seem to be situations where 
there are conscious states without such global effects (e.g. conscious peripheral perceptions), and non- 
conscious states with global effects (e.g. non-conscious thoughts as steps in problem solving). Thus it 
does not seem reasonable to identify consciousness with the operation of a global workspace or com- 
mon pools of information in connection with neural processes, even though these may often be cor- 
related (for discussion, see Velmans 2009: 274-81). We will return to the issue of consciousness later. 
 
7. The Ontological Interpretation and the History of Panpsychism 
The ontological interpretation resonates with many panpsychist approaches in the history of phi- 
losophy. We saw previously that this interpretation involves a top-down approach in the sense that 
the basic law (which involves active information) refers to the whole universe, and that through 
factorization we  get relatively independent sub-wholes, each guided by  their pools of informa-  
tion. We can even imagine a wide range of situations where the quantum potential (and thus the 
influence of active information) upon an elementary particle becomes negligibly small, in which 
case classical physics provides a good approximate description of the behaviour of the particle (and 
aggregates of such particles, such as tables and chairs). In this sense any Bohmian panpsychism is top 
down – a mind-like quality (active information) is an essential part of the basic law that applies to 
the universe as a whole, but it is not necessary to always attribute mind-like qualities to the ultimate 
constituents of matter. The Bohmian scheme thus allows us to make a distinction between things 
with mind-like qualities and things lacking mind-like qualities. At the level of fundamental physics, 
particles for which the quantum potential is negligible lack (for all practical purposes) mind-like 
qualities, while particles for which the quantum potential is non-negligible have mind-like quali- 
ties. Similarly, at the macroscopic level we can make a distinction between systems where some kind 
of active information is having a non-negligible effect (and the system [e.g., a chair] has mind-like 
qualities) and systems where such effect is negligibly small (and the system has no mind-like quali- 
ties). This view is reminiscent of Fechner’s  endorsement of a “world-mind” of which everything is  
a part. Fechner’s view did not require that every thing in the world be itself enminded (Seager and 
Allen-Hermanson 2015: 5). 
Bohm’s way of thinking fits particularly well with Leibniz’s panpsychism. Leibniz’s idea that each 
monad carries within it complete information about the entire universe is captured by Bohm’s gen- 
eral notion of the implicate order, according to which each part of the universe enfolds information 
about the universe as a whole in a holographic manner (Bohm 1980; see also Pylkkänen 2007, Seager 
2013). For Leibniz space and time emerge from sets of relations amongst the monads (Seager and 
Allen-Hermanson 2015 11). This again fits with the idea that the implicate order describes a kind   
of pre-space out of which the ordinary 3-dimensional space unfolds (Bohm and Hiley 1984). Seager 
and Allen-Hermanson note that the only model Leibniz found adequate to describe his monads    
was one of perception and spontaneous activity. This is analogous with the Bohmian electron, if    
we assume there is a sense in which the electron “perceives” its environment via the quantum field, 
and that the flexibility allowed by the hierarchy of quantum fields of information makes possible a 
kind of spontaneity on the activity of the electron. A further similarity between the Leibnizian and 
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Bohmian panpsychist schemes is that both can make a distinction between things that have mental 
attributes from those who do not. Leibniz held that there is a difference between a “mere aggregate” 
(e.g. a heap of sand) and the “organic unity” of an organism. In Bohmian terms a “mere aggregate” 
corresponds to a situation where the wave  function of a system of particles has factorized in such     
a way that each particle is guided only by its own pool of information (and when the quantum 
potential of a particle has a negligible effect, so that classical laws prevail), while “organic unity” cor- 
responds to a situation where particles are guided by a common pool of information, with a non- 
negligible quantum potential. 
 
8. An analogical argument for panpsychism based 
on the ontological interpretation 
Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2015: 26) characterize a typical argument from analogy for panpsy- 
chism as follows: “if we look closely, with an open mind, we see that even the simplest forms of mat- 
ter actually exhibit behavior which is akin to that we associate with mentality in animals and human 
beings.” They note that one fairly promising analogy is provided by the indeterminism of quantum 
mechanics, and draw attention to how Whitehead wanted to see this indeterminacy “. . . as an expres- 
sion not of blind chance but spontaneous freedom in response to a kind of informational inclination 
rather than mechanical causation.” This general idea fits quite well with the way  Bohm made use   
of notions such as active information and “generative order” to characterize freedom and causation 
(Bohm and Peat 2000). While it is usually assumed that quantum indeterminacy is pure randomness 
and as such remote from deliberation, decision and indecision (Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2015: 
27), reasonable extensions of quantum theory (e.g. Penrose 1994; Bohm and Hiley 1993: 378-381) 
can go towards capturing the kind of interplay of spontaneity, contingency and determination that is 
characteristic of human deliberation and decision. 
Seager and Allen-Hermanson think that a more promising quantum theory related analogical 
argument for panpsychism has to do with the relation between consciousness and information. The 
idea is that an important function of consciousness is to integrate information and to monitor exter- 
nal and internal states. This idea can be developed into a view that monitoring and integrated infor- 
mation actually make for consciousness (Lycan 1996: 40, quoted in Seager and Allen-Hermanson 
2015: 27). Seager and Allen-Hermanson note: “. . . it follows from this view that if information 
monitoring is a fundamental and pervasive feature of the world at even the most basic levels, then 
consciousness too should appear at those levels” (2015: 27-8). There is a sense in which quantum 
theoretical active information involves information monitoring, so in case the ontological interpreta- 
tion is correct, philosophers who emphasize the link between monitoring and consciousness, such as 
Lycan, may be closer to panpsychism than they realize (cf. Lycan’s remarks about the lack of scientific 
evidence for panpsychism that we cited in the Introduction). Also, Seager and Allen-Hermanson 
suggest that already according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory, experiments on entan- 
gled photons imply that two entangled photons are effectively monitoring each other’s state of 
polarization (2015: 28). Thus, regardless of whether we are using Bohm and Hiley’s ontological 
interpretation, or the usual interpretation of quantum theory, it can be argued that quantum theory 
implies that some kind of superluminal informational monitoring is taking place at a fundamental 
level of the physical world (it is likely, however, that this does not involve superluminal signaling or 
communication, see Walleczek and Grössing (2016)). 
If one accepts that monitoring and integrated information make for consciousness then, if Seager 
and Allen-Hermanson are correct, the quantum theory implies that there is at least elementary con- 
sciousness associated with quantum phenomena. However, as we have seen, Bohm for one thought 
that it is obvious that elementary particles are not conscious. We will return to this issue later. 
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9. The Combination Problem 
Bohm and Hiley’s interpretation provides a novel way of approaching the combination problem   
of panpsychism, i.e. the problem of explaining how the (primitive) consciousness of the  ele- 
ments of a system could possibly combine into the full consciousness of the system. Nagel, for 
example, worries about not only what the  proto-mental properties of  atoms could possibly be 
but also about how they could “combine to form the mental life that we are all familiar” and  
“how could any properties of the chemical constituents of a brain combine to form a  mental 
life?” (1986: 49–50). 
We have seen already that quantum theory challenges some key assumptions on the basis of which 
the combination problem has traditionally been formulated in the first place. For while the problem 
typically presupposes in a bottom-up fashion that the properties of the whole have to be explained  
in terms of the properties of the parts, quantum theory strongly points to a monistic ontology, in the 
sense that the whole is prior to its parts (cf. Schaffer 2010). This does not deny the existence of the 
parts, nor does it deny that some aspects of the whole can be conveniently understood in terms of 
the properties of the parts. But, as we have seen earlier, there are quite generally instances in quantum 
theory (brought out especially clearly by the ontological interpretation) where the whole is prior to 
parts in the sense that the behaviour of individual particles cannot be understood in terms of their 
spatial relationships only. So we do not explain the behaviour of the whole in a bottom-up way in 
terms of the behaviour of the parts, but rather explain the behaviour of the parts in a top-down way 
partly in terms of the properties of the whole. 
We also saw that in terms of the ontological interpretation, the particles in a many-body quan- 
tum system are guided by a “common pool” of information that cannot be reduced to the “private 
pools” of individual particles. On the contrary, the whole is prior to the parts in the sense that     
these private pools arise from the common pool in certain circumstances through factorization.  
Thus quantum reality seems to provide a powerful holistic principle of combination, which in the 
ontological interpretation can be understood in terms of a quantum potential, a new kind of non- 
local, holistic organizing factor. Regarding the combination problem, the ontological interpretation 
provides one way of understanding, at least as an analogy, how a subsystem (such as a human being) 
can have  properties (e.g. consciousness) that need not be accounted for entirely by  the properties   
of the parts of the subsystem (e.g. elementary consciousness of the parts). Thus, while the ontologi- 
cal interpretation has a panpsychist flavour in postulating that elementary particles have mind-like 
qualities (when the quantum potential for a particle is non-negligible), its emphasis on the priority  
of the whole goes against the spirit of the bottom-up way of explaining consciousness characteristic 
of traditional panpsychism. This can be seen as a deflationary approach to the combination problem 
(Ilpo Hirvonen, private communication). 
 
10. Active Information and Conscious Experience 
The preceding gives rise to the question of what the origin of conscious experience is in the Bohm- 
ian scheme. We have noted that in this scheme the whole is primary, in the sense that active informa- 
tion associated with an elementary particle derives from a common pool of information, ultimately 
that of the universe as a whole. However, if we think of the quantum field of the universe in the  
light of the ontological interpretation, there seems to be no reason to think that the active informa- 
tion encoded in this vastly multidimensional quantum field is conscious. Indeed, while Bohm saw 
nature as a dynamic process where information and meaning play a key dynamic role, he assumed 
that “99.99 per cent “of our meanings are not conscious (see Weber 1987: 439). But how can one 
then address the problem of consciousness in this scheme? In other words, why is there sometimes 
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conscious experience associated with the activity of information? Why doesn’t all the activity of 
information in humans proceed “in the dark”, as it seems to do in physical and biological processes 
in general? 
Given that Bohm’s mind-matter scheme has a hierarchical structure, one natural possibility to 
explore is whether some version of a higher-order theory of consciousness could be applied here. 
Alternatively one could try to apply Tononi’s integrated information theory of consciousness 
(Oizumi et al. 2014) to active information, or consider the relationship of the active information 
scheme (with its emphasis on common pools of information) to Baars’s (2007) global workspace 
theory of consciousness. Or perhaps a suitable combination and modification of these theories would 
do the job of accounting for consciousness in the active information scheme? One thing to consider 
here is that Tononi’s theory has been subject to severe criticisms by  Scott Aaronson, who argues  
that according to Tononi’s theory a simple Reed-Solomon decoding circuit would, if scaled to a 
large enough size, bring into being a consciousness vastly exceeding our own – something Aaronson 
thinks is simply absurd (for the debate, see Aaronson 2014a & 2014b). If we postulate that conscious- 
ness requires the activity Bohmian quantum information (or something analogous to it), such simple 
counterexamples will not work. In order for the system to be conscious, non-trivial quantum effects 
have to play a role in it. 
A simple possibility would be to postulate that what makes a given mental state (or level of 
information or mental activity) conscious is that there exists a higher level of (typically) unconscious 
information, which has the content that one is in the first order mental state or activity (cf. Rosenthal 
1997; Gennaro 2012). Note also that David Chalmers (1996) famously suggested that we tackle the 
hard problem of consciousness with a double-aspect theory of information. The idea is that infor- 
mation is a fundamental feature of the world, which always has both a phenomenal and a physical 
aspect. Now, we could take this idea to the Bohm scheme and postulate that active information, too, 
has phenomenal properties. This then raises the question about what we should think about the  
active information in the pilot wave of an electron. Does it, too, have phenomenal properties in some 
sense? We have seen that Bohm himself went as far as to say that an electron has a “primitive mind- 
like quality”, but by “mind” he was here referring to the “activity of form”, rather than conscious 
phenomenal experience in any full sense. 
I think that it is reasonable to combine Chalmers’s hypothesis with active information, but we 
need to restrict the hypothesis. For example, we could say that a certain kind of active information 
(for example, holistic active information that is analogous to quantum active information) has the 
potentiality for phenomenal properties, but this potentiality is actualized only in suitable circum- 
stances (for example, when a given level of active information is the intentional target of a higher 
level of active information; or if we want to follow a Tononian-Baarsian approach, we could say that 
suitably integrated active information which can act as a global workspace is conscious). Of course, 
this also opens up the possibility for genuine artificial consciousness. If we could implement suitably 
integrated quantum-like active information in an artificial system and set up suitable higher-order 
relationships between levels and a global workspace in the system, phenomenal properties should 
actualize themselves, according to this type of hypothesis. 
One advantage is that while Chalmers’s double-aspect theory suffers from epiphenomenalism, 
Bohm’s scheme, when modified, opens up the possibility of a genuine causal efficacy of phenomenal 
properties upon the physical domain (see Pylkkänen 2007: 244–6; Pylkkänen 2017). Also, Chalmers 
thinks it an interesting possibility that some sort of activity is required for experience, and that static 
information (e.g. information in a thermostat in a constant state) thus is not likely to have experience 
associated with it (1996: 298). If we say that phenomenal properties are always properties of some 
kind of Bohmian active information, we could do justice to the intuition that activity is required for 
experience. 
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11. Conclusion 
We started off by noting that, given the prima facie absurdity of the notion that physical ultimates have 
mental or even experiential properties, those who find panpsychist arguments convincing may find 
themselves overcome by panphobia. We then examined in some detail Bohm and Hiley’s proposal 
that elementary particles have mind-like qualities. Thus, panpsychism is not as anti-scientific as it 
may seem, and perhaps a cure or at least alleviation of panphobia is here available. However, there is 
one important point we need to consider. Bohm’s idea that elementary particles (or physical ulti- 
mates) are not conscious (and that the quantum field of the universe as a whole is not conscious) 
means that one needs to appeal to some kind of emergence to account for consciousness; and 
emergentism and panpsychism are often seen as competing doctrines (Seager and Allen-Hermanson 
2015: 3). Thus some panpsychists would not see the active information scheme – at least in the form 
I have  presented it here – as a genuinely panpsychist one, but rather as a form of emergentism. If  
so, I suggest that the active information scheme makes emergentism a more plausible doctrine. It is 
easier to see how a mind-like state can become conscious, than how a “purely physical” state can 
become conscious. This intuition is shared by some higher-order theorists (see e.g. Lycan’s 1996: 24) 
answer to the so-called problem of the rock for higher order theories). By postulating that mind-like 
qualities are a fundamental aspect of the universe, Bohm’s active information and implicate order 
schemes make the emergence of conscious experience more intelligible. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Valtteri Arstila, Ilpo Hirvonen, Kristjan Loorits and William Seager for their 
valuable comments on this chapter. The work for this chapter was partially funded by the Fetzer 
Franklin Fund of the John E. Fetzer Memorial Trust. 
 
References 
Aaronson, S. (2014a) ‘Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious Expander)’, 
Shtetl Optimized: The Blog of Scott Aaronson. https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 
Aaronson, S. (2014b)‘Giulio Tononi and Me: A Phi-nal Exchange’, Shtetl Optimized: The Blog of Scott Aaronson. 
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1823 
Baars, B. (2007).‘The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness’. In M. Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 236–46. 
Bacciagaluppi, G., and Valentini, A. (2009). Quantum Theory at a Crossroads: Reconsidering the 1927 Solvay Confer- 
ence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ball, P. (2011).‘The Dawn of Quantum Biology’. Nature 474, pp. 272-4. 
Barwise, J., and Seligman, J. (1997). Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bell, J. (1987). Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bohm, D. (1952a). ‘A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of “Hidden Variables I”’. 
Physical Review, 85 (2): 166–79. 
Bohm, D. (1952b). ‘A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of “Hidden Variables II”’. 
Physical Review, 85 (2): 180–93. 
Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge. 
Bohm, D. (1989). ‘Meaning and Information’. In P. Pylkkänen (ed.), The Search for Meaning. Wellingborough: 
Crucible, pp. 43–62. 
Bohm, D. (1990).‘A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter’. Philosophical Psychology, 3: 271–86. 
Bohm, D., and Hiley, B. J. (1975). ‘On the Intuitive Understanding of Non-Locality as Implied by Quantum 
Theory’. Foundations of Physics, 5: 93–109. 
Bohm, D., and Hiley, B.J. (1984). ‘Generalization of the Twistor to Clifford Algebras as a Basis for Geometry’. 
Revista Brasileira de Fisica, Vol. Esp. Os 70 anos de Mário Schönberg, pp. 1-26. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Bohm, D., and Hiley, B. J. (1987). ‘An Ontological Basis for Quantum Theory: I. Non-Relativistic Particle 
Systems’. Physics Reports, 144 (6): 323–48. 
Bohm, D., and Hiley, B. J. (1993). The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory. Lon- 
don: Routledge. 
Bouwmeester, D., Ekert, A., and Zeilinger, A. K. (eds.) (2000). The Physics of Quantum Information: Quantum 
Cryptography, Quantum Teleportation, Quantum Computation. Heidelberg and Berlin: Spinger. 
Bricmont, J. (2016). Making Sense of Quantum Mechanics. Heidelberg: Springer. 
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Choustova, O. (2007). ‘Toward Quantum-Like Modeling of Financial Processes’. Journal of Physics: Conference 
Series, 70: 012006. 
Chrisley, R. C. (1997).‘Learning in Non-Superpositional Quantum Neurocomputers’. In Pylkkänen et al. (eds.) 
(1997), pp. 126–39. 
Dickson, M. (1996).‘Antidote or Theory?’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 27 (2): 229–38. 
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Filk, T. (2012).‘Quantum-Like Behavior of Classical Systems’. In J. Busemeyer, F. Dubois, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, 
and M. Melucci (eds.), Quantum Interaction (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 7620. Berlin: Springer, 
pp. 196–206. 
Flack, R., Monachello, V., Hiley, B.J. and Barker, P. (2018) ‘A Method for Mesuring the Weak Value of Spin for 
Metastable Atoms’ Entropy 20, 566. Republished in Walleczek et al. (eds.) (2018). 
Floridi, Luciano (2015).‘Semantic Conceptions of Information’. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring 2015 edition. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/information-semantic/. 
Fodor, J. (1989).‘Making Mind Matter More’. Philosophical Topics, XVII (1): 59–79. 
Gennaro, R. (2012). The Consciousness Paradox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Goldstein, Sheldon (2013).‘Bohmian Mechanics’. In E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/qm-bohm/. 
Hameroff, S., and Penrose, R. (2014). ‘Consciousness in the Universe: A Review of the “Orch OR theory”’. 
Physics of Life Reviews, 11 (1): 39–78. 
Haven, E. (2005). ‘Pilot-Wave Theory and Financial Option Pricing’. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 
44: 1957–62. 
Hiley, B.J. and Pylkkänen, P. (1997).‘Active Information and Cognitive Science: A Reply to Kieseppä’. In Pylk- 
känen et al. (eds.) (1997), pp. 64–85. 
Hiley, B. J., and Pylkkänen, P. (2001). ‘Naturalizing the Mind in a Quantum Framework’. In P. Pylkkänen and 
T. Vadén (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 119–44. 
Hiley, B.J., and Pylkkänen, P. (2005) ‘Can Mind Affect Matter Via Active Information’. Mind and Matter 3 (2): 
7-26, URL = http://www.mindmatter.de/resources/pdf/hileywww.pdf 
Holland, P. (1995). The Quantum Theory of Motion. An Account of the de Broglie – Bohm Causal Interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Holland, P. (2011).‘A Quantum of History’. Contemporary Physics, 52 (4): 355–8. 
Ismael, J.T. (2016). How Physics Makes Us Free. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jammer, M. (1998). ‘David Bohm and His Work: On the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday’. Foundations of 
Physics, 18: 691–9. 
Khrennikov, A. (2004). Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Series: Funda- 
mental Theories of Physics, vol. 138. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Kieseppä, I. A. (1997a). ‘Is David Bohm’s Notion of Active Information Useful in Cognitive Science?’ In Pylk- 
känen et al. (eds.) (1997), pp. 54–63. 
Kieseppä, I. A. (1997b).‘On the Difference Between Quantum and Classical Potentials – A Reply to Hiley and 
Pylkkänen’. In Pylkkänen et al. (eds.) (1997), pp. 86–99. 
Lewis. P. (2016). Quantum Ontology. A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lycan, W. G.(1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lycan, W.G. (2006).‘Resisting ?-ism’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 65-71. 
Maleeh, R., and Amani, P. (2012).‘Bohm’s Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter Revisited’. Neuro- 
quantology, 10: 150–63. 
Marais, A., et al. (2018) ‘The Future of Quantum Biology’. J. R. Soc. Interface 15: 20180640. 
Maroney, O. (2002). Information and Entropy in Quantum Theory. Ph D thesis, Birkbeck College, University of 
London. www.bbk.ac.uk/tpru/OwenMaroney/thesis/thesis.html. 
Maroney, O., and Hiley, B. J. (1999).‘Quantum State Teleportation Understood Through the Bohm Interpreta- 
tion’. Foundations of Physics, 29 (9): 1403–15. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
McGinn, C. (2006).‘Hard questions’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 90-99. 
Nagel, T. (1979).‘Panpsychism’. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 181–95. 
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ney, A., and Albert, D. (2013). The Wave Function: Essays on th Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., and Tononi, G. (2014). ‘From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Con- 
sciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0’. PLoS Computational Biology, 10 (5): e1003588. 
Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Philippidis, C., Dewdney, C., and Hiley, B. J. (1979). ‘Quantum Interference and the Quantum Potential’. Il 
Nuovo Cimento, 52 (1): 15–28. 
Plotnitsky, A. (2010). Epistemology and Probability. Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger and the Nature of Quantum-Theoretical 
Thinking. Heidelberg and New York: Springer. 
Polkinghorne, J. (2002) Quantum Theory: AVery Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pylkkänen, P. (1992). Mind, Matter and Active Information. Reports from the Department of Philosophy No. 2, 
University of Helsinki. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino. 
Pylkkänen, P. (1996). ‘On Baking Conscious Cake with Quantum Yeast and Flour’. In J. Shawe-Taylor (ed.), 
Consciousness at a Crossroads of Cognitive Science and Phenomenology. Thorverton: Imprint Academic. 
Pylkkänen, P. (2007). Mind, Matter and the Implicate Order. Berlin and New York: Springer (Frontiers Collection). 
Pylkkänen. P. (2016). ‘Can Bohmian Quantum Information Help Us to Understand Consciousness?’ In 
H. Atmanspacher, T. Filk, and E. Pothos (eds.), Quantum Interaction 2015: 9th International Conference, Revised 
Selected Papers. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 76–87. 
Pylkkänen, P. (2017). ‘Is There Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role of Consciousness?’      
In A. Khrennikov and E. Haven (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Quantum Models in Social Science. London: 
Macmillan, pp. 293–318. 
Pylkkänen, P. (2018). ‘Quantum Theories of Consciousness’. In R. J. Gennaro (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of 
Consciousness. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 216-231. 
Pylkkänen, P., Hiley, B. J. and Pättiniemi, I. (2016). ‘Bohm’s Approach and Individuality’. In A. Guay and 
T. Pradeu (eds.), Individuals Across the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 226–49. http://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1405.4772. 
Pylkkänen, P., Pylkkö, P. and Hautamäki, A. (eds.), Brain, Mind and Physics. Amsterdam: IOS Press 
Riggs, P. (2008).‘Reflections on the de Broglie – Bohm Quantum Potential’. Erkenntnis, 68: 21–39. 
Roederer, J. G. (2005). Information and Its Role in Nature. Berlin: Springer. 
Rosenthal, D. (1997). ‘A Theory of Consciousness’. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The 
Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 729–53. 
Rosenthal, D. (2009).‘Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness’. In W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Conscious- 
ness. New York: Elsevier. 
Schaffer, J. (2010).‘Monism: The Priority of the Whole’. Philosophical Review, 119 (1): 31–76. 
Seager, W. (2013).‘Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order’. Foundations of Physics, 43: 548–67. 
Seager, W. (2018).‘The Philosophical and Scientific Metaphysics of David Bohm’. Entropy 20, 493. Republished 
in Walleczek et al. eds (2018). 
Seager, W., and Allen-Hermanson, S. (2015).‘Panpsychism’. In E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso- 
phy, Fall 2015 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/panpsychism/. 
Simons, P. (2006).‘The seeds of experience’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 146-50. 
Smith, Q. (2003). ‘Why Cognitive Scientists Cannot Ignore Quantum Mechanics?’ In Q. Smith and A. Jokic 
(eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 409–46. 
Strawson, Galen (2006). ‘Realistic Monism – Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism’. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 13 (10–11): 3–31. 
Tononi, G., and Koch, C. (2014). ‘Consciousness: Here, There but Not Everywhere’. https://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1405.7089v1. (Published as ‘Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?’ Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society B, 370: 20140167.). 
Velmans, M. (1991a).‘Is Human Information Processing Conscious?’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4): 651–69. 
Velmans, M. (1991b).‘Consciousness from a First-Person Perspective’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14 (4): 702–26. 
Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding Consciousness, 2nd edition. London: Routledge. 
Walleczek, J., and Grössing, G. (2016).‘Nonlocal Quantum Information Transfer Without Superluminal Signal- 
ling and Communication’. Foundations of Physics, 46 (9): 1208–28. 
Walleczek, J., Grössing, G., Pylkkänen, P., and Hiley B.J. (2018). Emergent Quantum Mechanics: David Bohm Cen- 
tennial Perspectives. Printed Edition of the Special Issue Published in Entropy. Basel: MDPI. Free download: 
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/2/113 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Wang, Z., Busemeyer, J. R., Atmanspacher, H., and Pothos, E. M. (2013). ‘The Potential of Using Quantum 
Theory to Build Models of Cognition’. Topics in Cognitive Science, 5: 672–88. 
Weber, R. (1987). ‘Meaning as Being in the Implicate Order Philosophy of David Bohm: A Conversation’.       
In B. Hiley and F. Peat (eds.), Quantum Implications: Essays in Honour of David Bohm. London: Routledge, 
pp. 436–50. 
Wendt, A. (2015). Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

